The following is the text of UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Hans
Blix's report to the United Nations on Jan. 27, 2003:
The resolution adopted by the Security Council on Iraq in
November last year asks UNMOVIC and the IAEA to "update" the
Council 60 days after the resumption of inspections. This is
today. The updating, it seems, forms part of an assessment by
the Council and its Members of the results, so far, of the
inspections and of their role as a means to achieve verifiable
disarmament in Iraq.
As this is an open meeting of the Council, it may be appropriate
briefly to provide some background for a better understanding of
where we stand today.
With your permission, I shall do so.
I begin by recalling that inspections as a part of a disarmament
process in Iraq started in 1991, immediately after the Gulf War.
They went on for eight years until December 1998, when
inspectors were withdrawn. Thereafter, for nearly four years
there were no inspections. They were resumed only at the end of
November last year.
While the fundamental aim of inspections in Iraq has always been
to verify disarmament, the successive resolutions adopted by the
Council over the years have varied somewhat in emphasis and
approach.
In 1991, Resolution 687 (1991), adopted unanimously as a part of
the cease-fire after the Gulf War, had five major elements. The
three first related to disarmament. They called for:
Declarations by Iraq of its programs of weapons of mass
destruction and long-range missiles;
Verification of the declarations through UNSCOM and the IAEA;
Supervision by these organizations of the destruction or the
elimination of proscribed programs and items.
After the completion of the disarmament:
The Council would have authority to proceed to a lifting of
the sanctions (economic restrictions); and
The inspecting organizations would move to long-term ongoing
monitoring and verification.
Resolution 687 (1991), like the subsequent resolutions I shall
refer to, required cooperation by Iraq but such was often
withheld or given grudgingly. Unlike South Africa, which decided
on its own to eliminate its nuclear weapons and welcomed
inspection as a means of creating confidence in its disarmament,
Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance not even
today of the disarmament, which was demanded of it and which
it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to
live in peace.
As we know, the twin operation "declare and verify," which was
prescribed in resolution 687 (1991), too often turned into a
game of "hide and seek." Rather than just verifying declarations
and supporting evidence, the two inspecting organizations found
themselves engaged in efforts to map the weapons programs and to
search for evidence through inspections, interviews, seminars,
inquiries with suppliers and intelligence organizations.
As a result, the disarmament phase was not completed in the
short time expected. Sanctions remained and took a severe toll
until Iraq accepted the Oil for Food Program and the gradual
development of that program mitigated the effects of the
sanctions.
The implementation of resolution 687 (1991) nevertheless brought
about considerable disarmament results. It has been recognized
that more weapons of mass destruction were destroyed under this
resolution than were destroyed during the Gulf War: large
quantities of chemical weapons were destroyed under UNSCOM
supervision before 1994.
While Iraq claims with little evidence that it destroyed all
biological weapons unilaterally in 1991, it is certain that
UNSCOM destroyed large biological weapons production facilities
in 1996. The large nuclear infrastructure was destroyed and the
fissionable material was removed from Iraq by the IAEA.
One of three important questions before us today is how much
might remain undeclared and intact from before 1991; and,
possibly, thereafter; the second question is what, if anything,
was illegally produced or procured after 1998, when the
inspectors left; and the third question is how it can be
prevented that any weapons of mass destruction be produced or
procured in the future.
In December 1999 after one year without inspections in Iraq
Resolution 1284 (1999) was adopted by the Council with four
abstentions. Supplementing the basic resolutions of 1991 and
following years, it provided Iraq with a somewhat less ambitious
approach: In return for "cooperation in all respects" for a
specified period of time, including progress in the resolution
of "key remaining disarmament tasks", it opened the possibility,
not for the lifting, but the suspension of sanctions.
For nearly three years, Iraq refused to accept any inspections
by UNMOVIC. It was only after appeals by the Secretary-General
and Arab states and pressure by the United States and other
Member States, that Iraq declared on 16 September last year that
it would again accept inspections without conditions.
Resolution 1441 (2002) was adopted on 8 November last year and
emphatically reaffirmed the demand on Iraq to cooperate. It
required this cooperation to be immediate, unconditional and
active. The resolution contained many provisions, which we
welcome as enhancing and strengthening the inspection regime.
The unanimity by which it was adopted sent a powerful signal
that the Council was of one mind in creating a last opportunity
for peaceful disarmament in Iraq through inspection.
UNMOVIC shares the sense of urgency felt by the Council to use
inspection as a path to attain, within a reasonable time,
verifiable disarmament of Iraq. Under the resolutions I have
cited, it would be followed by monitoring for such time as the
Council feels would be required. The resolutions also point to a
zone free of weapons of mass destruction as the ultimate goal.
As a subsidiary body of the Council, UNMOVIC is fully aware of
and appreciates the close attention, which the Council devotes
to the inspections in Iraq. While today's "updating" is foreseen
in Resolution 1441 (2002), the Council can and does call for
additional briefings whenever it wishes. One was held on 19
January and a further such briefing is tentatively set for 14
February.
I turn now to the key requirement of cooperation and Iraq's
response to it. Cooperation might be said to relate to both
substance and process. It would appear from our experience so
far that Iraq has decided in principle to provide cooperation on
process, notably access. A similar decision is indispensable to
provide cooperation on substance in order to bring the
disarmament task to completion through the peaceful process of
inspection and to bring the monitoring task on a firm course. An
initial minor step would be to adopt the long-overdue
legislation required by the resolutions.
I shall deal first with cooperation on process.
Cooperation on Process
It has regard to the procedures, mechanisms, infrastructure and
practical arrangements to pursue inspections and seek verifiable
disarmament. While inspection is not built on the premise of
confidence but may lead to confidence if it is successful, there
must nevertheless be a measure of mutual confidence from the
very beginning in running the operation of inspection.
Iraq has on the whole cooperated rather well so far with UNMOVIC
in this field. The most important point to make is that access
has been provided to all sites we have wanted to inspect and
with one exception it has been prompt. We have further had great
help in building up the infrastructure of our office in Baghdad
and the field office in Mosul. Arrangements and services for our
plane and our helicopters have been good. The environment has
been workable.
Our inspections have included universities, military bases,
presidential sites and private residences. Inspections have also
taken place on Fridays, the Muslim day of rest, on Christmas Day
and New Year's Day. These inspections have been conducted in the
same manner as all other inspections. We seek to be both
effective and correct.
In this updating I am bound, however, to register some problems.
Firstly, relating to two kinds of air operations.
While we now have the technical capability to send a U-2 plane
placed at our disposal for aerial imagery and for surveillance
during inspections and have informed Iraq that we planned to do
so, Iraq has refused to guarantee its safety, unless a number of
conditions are fulfilled. As these conditions went beyond what
is stipulated in Resolution 1441 (2002) and what was practiced
by UNSCOM and Iraq in the past, we note that Iraq is not so far
complying with our request. I hope this attitude will change.
Another air operation problem which was solved during our
recent talks in Baghdad concerned the use of helicopters
flying into the no-fly zones. Iraq had insisted on sending
helicopters of their own to accompany ours. This would have
raised a safety problem. The matter was solved by an offer on
our part to take the accompanying Iraq minders in our
helicopters to the sites, an arrangement that had been practiced
by UNSCOM in the past.
I am obliged to note some recent disturbing incidents and
harassment. For instance, for some time farfetched allegations
have been made publicly that questions posed by inspectors were
of intelligence character. While I might not defend every
question that inspectors might have asked, Iraq knows that they
do not serve intelligence purposes and Iraq should not say so.
On a number of occasions, demonstrations have taken place in
front of our offices and at inspection sites.
The other day, a sightseeing excursion by five inspectors to a
mosque was followed by an unwarranted public outburst. The
inspectors went without any UN insignia and were welcomed in the
kind manner that is characteristic of the normal Iraqi attitude
to foreigners. They took off their shoes and were taken around.
They asked perfectly innocent questions and parted with the
invitation to come again.
Shortly thereafter, we receive protests from the Iraqi
authorities about an unannounced inspection and about questions
not relevant to weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, they were
not. Demonstrations and outbursts of this kind are unlikely to
occur in Iraq without initiative or encouragement from the
authorities. We must ask ourselves what the motives may be for
these events. They do not facilitate an already difficult job,
in which we try to be effective, professional and, at the same
time, correct. Where our Iraqi counterparts have some complaint
they can take it up in a calmer and less unpleasant manner.
Cooperation on Substance
The substantive cooperation required relates above all to the
obligation of Iraq to declare all programs of weapons of mass
destruction and either to present items and activities for
elimination or else to provide evidence supporting the
conclusion that nothing proscribed remains.
Paragraph 9 of Resolution 1441 (2002) states that this
cooperation shall be "active". It is not enough to open doors.
Inspection is not a game of "catch as catch can". Rather, as I
noted, it is a process of verification for the purpose of
creating confidence. It is not built upon the premise of trust.
Rather, it is designed to lead to trust, if there is both
openness to the inspectors and action to present them with items
to destroy or credible evidence about the absence of any such
items.
The Declaration of 7 December
On 7 December 2002, Iraq submitted a declaration of some 12,000
pages in response to Paragraph 3 of Resolution 1441 (2002) and
within the time stipulated by the Security Council. In the
fields of missiles and biotechnology, the declaration contains a
good deal of new material and information covering the period
from 1998 and onward. This is welcome.
One might have expected that in preparing the Declaration, Iraq
would have tried to respond to, clarify and submit supporting
evidence regarding the many open disarmament issues, which the
Iraqi side should be familiar with from the UNSCOM document
(S/1999/94) of January 1999 and the so-called Amorim Report of
March 1999 (S/1999/356). These are questions which UNMOVIC,
governments and independent commentators have often cited.
While UNMOVIC has been preparing its own list of
current "unresolved disarmament issues" and "key remaining
disarmament tasks" in response to requirements in resolution
1284 (1999), we find the issues listed in the two reports as
unresolved, professionally justified. These reports do not
contend that weapons of mass destruction remain in Iraq, but nor
do they exclude that possibility. They point to lack of evidence
and inconsistencies, which raise question marks, which must be
straightened out, if weapons dossiers are to be closed and
confidence is to arise.
They deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq rather than being
brushed aside as evil machinations of UNSCOM. Regrettably, the
12,000 page declaration, most of which is a reprint of earlier
documents, does not seem to contain any new evidence that would
eliminate the questions or reduce their number. Even Iraq's
letter sent in response to our recent discussions in Baghdad to
the President of the Security Council on 24 January does not
lead us to the resolution of these issues.
I shall only give some examples of issues and questions that
need to be answered and I turn first to the sector of chemical
weapons.
Chemical Weapons
The nerve agent VX is one of the most toxic ever developed.
Iraq has declared that it only produced VX on a pilot scale,
just a few [metric] tons and that the quality was poor and the
product unstable. Consequently, it was said, that the agent was
never weaponized. Iraq said that the small quantity of agent
remaining after the Gulf War was unilaterally destroyed in the
summer of 1991.
UNMOVIC, however, has information that conflicts with this
account. There are indications that Iraq had worked on the
problem of purity and stabilization and that more had been
achieved than has been declared. Indeed, even one of the
documents provided by Iraq indicates that the purity of the
agent, at least in laboratory production, was higher than
declared.
There are also indications that the agent was weaponizied. In
addition, there are questions to be answered concerning the fate
of the VX precursor chemicals, which Iraq states were lost
during bombing in the Gulf War or were unilaterally destroyed by
Iraq.
I would now like to turn to the so-called "Air Force document"
that I have discussed with the Council before. This document was
originally found by an UNSCOM inspector in a safe in Iraqi Air
Force Headquarters in 1998 and taken from her by Iraqi minders.
It gives an account of the expenditure of bombs, including
chemical bombs, by Iraq in the Iraq-Iran War. I am encouraged by
the fact that Iraq has now provided this document to UNMOVIC.
The document indicates that 13,000 chemical bombs were dropped
by the Iraqi Air Force between 1983 and 1988, while Iraq has
declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during this period.
Thus, there is a discrepancy of 6,500 bombs. The amount of
chemical agent in these bombs would be in the order of about
1,000 [metric] tons. In the absence of evidence to the contrary,
we must assume that these quantities are now unaccounted for.
The discovery of a number of 122 mm chemical rocket warheads in
a bunker at a storage depot 170 km southwest of Baghdad was much
publicized. This was a relatively new bunker and therefore the
rockets must have been moved there in the past few years, at a
time when Iraq should not have had such munitions.
The investigation of these rockets is still proceeding. Iraq
states that they were overlooked from 1991 from a batch of some
2,000 that were stored there during the Gulf War. This could be
the case. They could also be the tip of a submerged iceberg. The
discovery of a few rockets does not resolve but rather points to
the issue of several thousands of chemical rockets that are
unaccounted for.
The finding of the rockets shows that Iraq needs to make more
effort to ensure that its declaration is currently accurate.
During my recent discussions in Baghdad, Iraq declared that it
would make new efforts in this regard and had set up a committee
of investigation. Since then it has reported that it has found a
further four chemical rockets at a storage depot in Al Taji.
I might further mention that inspectors have found at another
site a laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas
precursor.
Whilst I am addressing chemical issues, I should mention a
matter, which I reported on 19 December 2002, concerning
equipment at a civilian chemical plant at Al Fallujah. Iraq has
declared that it had repaired chemical processing equipment
previously destroyed under UNSCOM supervision, and had installed
it at Fallujah for the production of chlorine and phenols. We
have inspected this equipment and are conducting a detailed
technical evaluation of it. On completion, we will decide
whether this and other equipment that has been recovered by Iraq
should be destroyed.
Biological Weapons
I have mentioned the issue of anthrax to the Council on previous
occasions and I come back to it as it is an important one.
Iraq has declared that it produced about 8,500 liters of this
biological warfare agent, which it states it unilaterally
destroyed in the summer of 1991. Iraq has provided little
evidence for this production and no convincing evidence for its
destruction.
There are strong indications that Iraq produced more anthrax
than it declared, and that at least some of this was retained
after the declared destruction date. It might still exist.
Either it should be found and be destroyed under UNMOVIC
supervision or else convincing evidence should be produced to
show that it was, indeed, destroyed in 1991.
As I reported to the Council on 19 December last year, Iraq did
not declare a significant quantity, some 650 kg, of bacterial
growth media, which was acknowledged as imported in Iraq's
submission to the Amorim panel in February 1999. As part of its
7 December 2002 declaration, Iraq resubmitted the Amorim panel
document, but the table showing this particular import of media
was not included. The absence of this table would appear to be
deliberate as the pages of the resubmitted document were
renumbered.
In the letter of 24 January to the President of the Council,
Iraq's Foreign Minister stated that "all imported quantities of
growth media were declared". This is not evidence. I note that
the quantity of media involved would suffice to produce, for
example, about 5,000 liters of concentrated anthrax.
Missiles
I turn now to the missile sector. There remain significant
questions as to whether Iraq retained SCUD-type missiles after
the Gulf War. Iraq declared the consumption of a number of SCUD
missiles as targets in the development of an anti-ballistic
missile defense system during the 1980s. Yet no technical
information has been produced about that program or data on the
consumption of the missiles.
There has been a range of developments in the missile field
during the past four years presented by Iraq as non-proscribed
activities. We are trying to gather a clear understanding of
them through inspections and on-site discussions.
Two projects in particular stand out. They are the development
of a liquid-fueled missile named the Al Samoud 2, and a solid
propellant missile, called the Al Fatah. Both missiles have been
tested to a range in excess of the permitted range of 150 km,
with the Al Samoud 2 being tested to a maximum of 183 km and the
Al Fatah to 161 km. Some of both types of missiles have already
been provided to the Iraqi Armed Forces even though it is stated
that they are still undergoing development.
The Al Samoud's diameter was increased from an earlier version
to the present 760 mm. This modification was made despite a 1994
letter from the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM directing Iraq to
limit its missile diameters to less than 600 mm. Furthermore, a
November 1997 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM to
Iraq prohibited the use of engines from certain surface-to-air
missiles for the use in ballistic missiles.
During my recent meeting in Baghdad, we were briefed on these
two programs. We were told that the final range for both systems
would be less than the permitted maximum range of 150 km.
These missiles might well represent prima facie cases of
proscribed systems. The test ranges in excess of 150 km are
significant, but some further technical considerations need to
be made, before we reach a conclusion on this issue. In the mean
time, we have asked Iraq to cease flight tests of both missiles.
In addition, Iraq has refurbished its missile production
infrastructure. In particular, Iraq reconstituted a number of
casting chambers, which had previously been destroyed under
UNSCOM supervision. They had been used in the production of
solid-fuel missiles. Whatever missile system these chambers are
intended for, they could produce motors for missiles capable of
ranges significantly greater than 150 km.
Also associated with these missiles and related developments is
the import, which has been taking place during the last few
years, of a number of items despite the sanctions, including as
late as December 2002. Foremost amongst these is the import of
380 rocket engines which may be used for the Al Samoud 2.
Iraq also declared the recent import of chemicals used in
propellants, test instrumentation and, guidance and control
systems. These items may well be for proscribed purposes. That
is yet to be determined. What is clear is that they were
illegally brought into Iraq, that is, Iraq or some company in
Iraq, circumvented the restrictions imposed by various
resolutions.
Mr. President, I have touched upon some of the disarmament
issues that remain open and that need to be answered if dossiers
are to be closed and confidence is to arise. Which are the means
at the disposal of Iraq to answer these questions? I have
pointed to some during my presentation of the issues. Let me be
a little more systematic.
Our Iraqi counterparts are fond of saying that there are no
proscribed items and if no evidence is presented to the contrary
they should have the benefit of the doubt, be presumed innocent.
UNMOVIC, for its part, is not presuming that there are
proscribed items and activities in Iraq, but nor is it or I
think anyone else after the inspections between 1991 and 1998
presuming the opposite, that no such items and activities exist
in Iraq. Presumptions do not solve the problem. Evidence and
full transparency may help. Let me be specific.
Find the Items and Activities
Information provided by Member States tells us about the
movement and concealment of missiles and chemical weapons and
mobile units for biological weapons production. We shall
certainly follow up any credible leads given to us and report
what we might find as well as any denial of access.
So far we have reported on the recent find of a small number of
empty 122 mm warheads for chemical weapons. Iraq declared that
it appointed a commission of inquiry to look for more. Fine. Why
not extend the search to other items? Declare what may be found
and destroy it under our supervision?
Find Documents
When we have urged our Iraqi counterparts to present more
evidence, we have all too often met the response that there are
no more documents. All existing relevant documents have been
presented, we are told. All documents relating to the biological
weapons program were destroyed together with the weapons.
However, Iraq has all the archives of the Government and its
various departments, institutions and mechanisms. It should have
budgetary documents, requests for funds and reports on how they
have been used. It should also have letters of credit and bills
of lading, reports on production and losses of material.
In response to a recent UNMOVIC request for a number of specific
documents, the only new documents Iraq provided was a ledger of
193 pages which Iraq stated included all imports from 1983 to
1990 by the Technical and Scientific Importation Division, the
importing authority for the biological weapons program.
Potentially, it might help to clear some open issues.
The recent inspection find in the private home of a scientist of
a box of some 3,000 pages of documents, much of it relating to
the laser enrichment of uranium support a concern that has long
existed that documents might be distributed to the homes of
private individuals.
This interpretation is refuted by the Iraqi side, which claims
that research staff sometimes may bring home papers from their
work places. On our side, we cannot help but think that the case
might not be isolated and that such placements of documents is
deliberate to make discovery difficult and to seek to shield
documents by placing them in private homes.
Any further sign of the concealment of documents would be
serious. The Iraqi side committed itself at our recent talks to
encourage persons to accept access also to private sites. There
can be no sanctuaries for proscribed items, activities or
documents. A denial of prompt access to any site would be a very
serious matter.
Find Persons to Give Credible Information: A List of Personnel
When Iraq claims that tangible evidence in the form of documents
is not available, it ought at least to find individuals,
engineers, scientists and managers to testify about their
experience. Large weapons programs are moved and managed by
people. Interviews with individuals who may have worked in
programs in the past may fill blank spots in our knowledge and
understanding. It could also be useful to learn that they are
now employed in peaceful sectors. These were the reasons why
UNMOVIC asked for a list of such persons, in accordance with
resolution 1441.
Some 400 names for all biological and chemical weapons programs
as well as their missile programs were provided by the Iraqi
side. This can be compared to over 3,500 names of people
associated with those past weapons programs that UNSCOM either
interviewed in the 1990s or knew from documents and other
sources. At my recent meeting in Baghdad, the Iraqi side
committed itself to supplementing the list and some 80
additional names have been provided.
Allow Information Through Credible Interviews
In the past, much valuable information came from interviews.
There were also cases in which the interviewee was clearly
intimidated by the presence of and interruption by Iraqi
officials. This was the background of Resolution 1441's
provision for a right for UNMOVIC and the IAEA to hold private
interviews "in the mode or location" of our choice, in Baghdad
or even abroad.
To date, 11 individuals were asked for interviews in Baghdad by
us. The replies have invariably been that the individual will
only speak at Iraq's monitoring directorate or, at any rate, in
the presence of an Iraqi official. This could be due to a wish
on the part of the invited to have evidence that they have not
said anything that the authorities did not wish them to say.
At our recent talks in Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed itself
to encourage persons to accept interviews "in private", that is
to say alone with us. Despite this, the pattern has not changed.
However, we hope that with further encouragement from the
authorities, knowledgeable individuals will accept private
interviews, in Baghdad or abroad.
UNMOVIC's Capability
Mr President, I must not conclude this "update" without some
notes on the growing capability of UNMOVIC.
In the past two months, UNMOVIC has built-up its capabilities in
Iraq from nothing to 260 staff members from 60 countries. This
includes approximately 100 UNMOVIC inspectors, 60 air operations
staff, as well as security personnel, communications,
translation and interpretation staff, medical support, and other
services at our Baghdad office and Mosul field office. All serve
the United Nations and report to no one else.
Furthermore, our roster of inspectors will continue to grow as
our training program continues even at this moment we have a
training course in session in Vienna. At the end of that course,
we shall have a roster of about 350 qualified experts from which
to draw inspectors.
A team supplied by the Swiss Government is refurbishing our
offices in Baghdad, which had been empty for four years. The
Government of New Zealand has contributed both a medical team
and a communications team. The German Government will contribute
unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance and a group of
specialists to operate them for us within Iraq. The Government
of Cyprus has kindly allowed us to set up a Field Office in
Larnaca.
All these contributions have been of assistance in quickly
starting up our inspections and enhancing our capabilities. So
has help from the UN in New York and from sister organizations
in Baghdad.
In the past two months during which we have built-up our
presence in Iraq, we have conducted about 300 inspections to
more than 230 different sites. Of these, more than 20 were sites
that had not been inspected before. By the end of December,
UNMOVIC began using helicopters both for the transport of
inspectors and for actual inspection work.
We now have eight helicopters. They have already proved
invaluable in helping to "freeze" large sites by observing the
movement of traffic in and around the area.
Setting up a field office in Mosul has facilitated rapid
inspections of sites in northern Iraq. We plan to establish soon
a second field office in the Basra area, where we have already
inspected a number of sites.
Mr. President, we have now an inspection apparatus that permits
us to send multiple inspection teams every day all over Iraq, by
road or by air. Let me end by simply noting that that capability
which has been built-up in a short time and which is now
operating, is at the disposal of the Security Council.
